

cannot be granted asylum if the Attorney General determines that the applicant may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, to a safe third country in which the applicant's life or freedom would not be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (emphasis added). See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(6). However, the Immigration Judge did not find that Belgium is a party to a bilateral or multilateral agreement that would facilitate the respondent's removal to that country, nor is there record evidence that would support such a finding.

We note that although the Immigration Judge's decision included a passing reference to the firm resettlement provision in the Act and the regulations, it did not include clear factual findings and legal analysis relevant to determining whether the respondent can be considered to have been firmly resettled in Belgium, and, thus, ineligible for asylum under section 208(b)(2)(A)(vi) of the Act. See, e.g., *Mussie v. INS*, 172 F.3d 329, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1999) (discussing the firm resettlement bar). On remand, the Immigration Judge should clarify his findings and analysis on the issue of firm resettlement.

Finally, the Immigration Judge alternatively denied the respondent's asylum application as a matter of discretion because he had safe haven in Belgium and failed to avail himself of the protection of that country (I.J. at 16-17). We agree with the respondent that the Immigration Judge did not engage in the requisite balancing of factors before denying his asylum application as a matter of discretion. We have held in *Matter of T-Z-*, 24 I&N Dec. 163 (BIA 2007), that when an Immigration Judge denies asylum in the exercise of discretion and then grants withholding of removal, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e) requires the Immigration Judge to reconsider the denial of asylum and to take into account factors relevant to family unification. We note, moreover, that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in its intervening decision in *Zuh v. Mukasey*, 547 F.3d 504 (4th Cir. 2008), held that in denying asylum as a matter of discretion, the Immigration Judge must consider the "totality of the circumstances," "demonstrate that he or she reviewed the record and balanced the relevant factors," and "discuss the positive or adverse factors that support his or her decision." *Zuh v. Mukasey*, 547 F.3d at 510-12. On remand, the Immigration Judge should reconsider his discretionary determination in light of the regulations and Board and Fourth Circuit case precedent. Both parties may submit additional evidence and arguments relevant to the asylum application on remand. The following order shall be entered.

ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for reconsideration of the respondent's statutory and discretionary eligibility for asylum.



FOR THE BOARD